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1. INTRODUCTION
When OSSA asked me whether I was prepared to comment on this paper, and I only got
its title with the request, I was not in an emotional position to make a decision at that
moment as a couple of days before my mother had died. I decided to leave my reply for a
few weeks since I was not even sure that I could attend the conference. Certainly, my
sadness impeded any definite judgment then. Several weeks had gone by when I got
another notice about the request. This time I thought that, given the death of my mother,
this paper could provide an opportunity to reflect upon the period when she was ill in a
Nursing Home, especially the last two months when it became clear that she would die
soon. Throughout the ten months of her illness, the family engaged in many emotional
arguments about her situation. There were many arguments of the same kind with her
doctors and caregivers as well, and last but not least, with her friends, and some people
that we had met in the Nursing Home. Another important consideration for accepting to
comment on the paper was the fact that its title includes the concept of “dignity”:
certainly, this concept had been central in most, if not all, of the arguments that took
place during the period of my mother’s illness.
I will proceed by quoting the dictionary definitions of dignity because some of
these definitions are very close to the way we understood it in our argumentations. Below
I will attempt to relate these definitions to the theoretical discussions developed in the
paper I am commenting upon here.
According to Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary dignity means:
1: the quality or state of being worthy, honored, or esteemed 2 a: high rank, office, or position b:
a legal title of nobility or honor 3 archaic: DIGNITARY 4: formal reserve of manner or
language.

Cases number 2 and 3 in the above definitions, do correspond to what Teresa
Iglesias refers to as a limited historical aristocratic usage. Case 4 above does not relate to
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the way we understood dignity. Case 1 is not sufficiently clear, but at least provides the
notions of worthy and esteemed that indeed underlie our own way of using the concept.
However, the Spanish dictionary Pequeno Larousse Ilustrado gives to dignity the
exact meaning involved in our argumentations. According to this dictionary, “dignidad”
means, besides the traditional aristocratic meaning found in Webster’s dictionary:
“Respeto de si mismo.” That is to say, in English, “self-respect.”
This was the main idea involved in all of the arguments that we held between each
other, with doctors, caregivers, friends, and other people during the illness of my mother.
I should perhaps clarify here the she had suffered a stroke that left her relegated to a
wheel chair, and with an advanced dementia. She could only recognize some of the
immediate members of the family, but not grandchildren and great-grandchildren, and not
able to know what her condition was or know that she was in a Nursing Home. She lived
in different moments of her past and related to us at those moments. She did not live in
the here and now.
It could be claimed, therefore, that she could have no sense of self-respect as she
could not be aware of her condition. However, she did relate to her needs, protest when
she felt that she was not being taken care of adequately, and refuse things that altered her
sense of personal decision making. Beyond that, we felt that even if there is no fully
conscious sense of self-respect, members of the family who knew her so well could
contribute to a respectful care of her, that is, we could be the representatives of her selfrespect. I know that this is a contentious issue, among the several important issues
discussed in John Rief’s paper, but I believe that a case can be made that dignity entails a
strictly individual aspect as well as a community aspect: this is discussed in Rief’s paper,
and I will be addressing his work more specifically by quoting a key point there.
2. DIGNITY-BASED ARGUMENTATION
Before I do so, I must say that I have read this paper with great interest and have learnt a
good deal from attempting to understand the controversy between theorists who advocate
that dignity should be an essential concept involved in end of life argumentations and
those who oppose that view. I was not aware of these debates, and find them to be
extremely important in order to be prepared to participate, as members of contemporary
society, in decisions of all kinds pertaining to the way we should relate to being ill and in
need of medical treatment, and most especially, if we are related to people that are close
to death, and thus in great need of adequate decisions about it. This is an issue that relates
to everyone, and one that must be essential in a liberal and democratic society, as the
author makes clear in his paper. Since reading and commenting on the paper has been a
learning opportunity for me in the context of the death of my mother, I will concentrate
on this specific issue. As mentioned above, I now proceed to quote the passage that
became most important for me:
What Dennett offers here is dignity in two forms. First, there is the dignity of the individual in a
permanent vegetative state. Second, there is the dignity of the human community of which this
individual is part. Dignity refers to the overall situation or environment in which individuals
interact. It is the ground for deliberation about right action in the abstract that can then inform the
development of principles in the concrete world of the individual sufferer. Here is more evidence
that dignity refers to something beyond the principle of respect for persons. What should be done
with this individual is not simply a question of whether their autonomy or self-determination is
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maintained. Also at issue is what our actions in response to this person do to our conception of
who we are as a community. Iglesias denies the second understanding of dignity here. She argues
instead that ‘dignity belongs primarily to the individual. The human community finds its ultimate
concreteness in the human individuals by which it is constituted.’ I agree with Iglesias that each
individual is the bearer of dignity but it does not seem contradictory to also hold that the
community has dignity that can be and is violated by certain decisions.

The author goes on to claim that dignity must be understood as a dialectical
concept. I would like to side with John Rief on this point, but also to clarify the issue of
respect based on the definition of dignity as self-respect. I believe that the others,
including the community as a whole, must respect the self-respect inherent in everybody,
including their own individual self-respect. I mean, the respect of the community for the
self-respect of the, in this case, the dying person, is the reflection of a society that sees
itself with respect. This can happen when there is a democratic possibility of
development, and in the case of this conference, when there are democratic possibilities
for argumentation.
3. CONCLUSION
This last point takes me now, and in conclusion of my comments, to the relation between
the author’s discussions and argumentation. Certainly, John Rief has conceived his paper,
as the title says, in terms of “dignity-based argumentation at the end of life.” He cites
important authors in the argumentation theory tradition, such as Perelman and Toulmin,
as essential in order to understand real arguments as practiced by real people. He wants to
move away from strictly axiomatic ethical theorizing in order to move into the realm, as
he claims, of ethical deliberation. I understand this claim in the sense of evaluating
people’s decision of dying with dignity not on principles that are applied almost
mathematically, but on the real situations they are involved in, including the arguments
that take place.
However, and as rather critical points of the paper, I must say that I have missed
here an exposition and discussion of real arguments as they happen to real people. This
point is particularly sensitive to me because of the great number of arguments that my
family was involved in for those 10 months since my mother became so ill. One other
critical point, is that I have missed a discussion of the role that emotions play in the so
extraordinarily sensitive argumentation that John Rief presents in his very important and
illuminating paper.
Link to paper
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